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Unauthorized Tax Elections
JAY A. SOLED †
ABSTRACT
Unauthorized tax elections are those devices and
techniques that taxpayers employ to achieve sought-after
objectives but that are not specifically endorsed under the
Internal Revenue Code. Often evolving over time, they are a
common feature of the nation’s tax system. While
unauthorized tax elections can prove subversive, in many
instances, if properly and timely addressed, their existence
can produce salutary benefits vis-à-vis their eradication or
formal institutionalization.
This analysis explores the general contours of
unauthorized tax elections and the critical signaling roles
that they provide, alerting Congress and the Treasury
Department to shortcomings and vulnerabilities in the
Internal Revenue Code’s statutory language and/or
structural design. It concludes that both the legislative and
administrative branches of government would be wise to not
ignore these signals but instead to swiftly address them.

†Jay A. Soled is a professor at Rutgers Business School and directs its Masters
of Taxation Program. On many occasions, he has written and testified before
Congress on issues of tax compliance.
985

986

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ............................................................................ 985
INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 987
I. THE GENESIS AND NATURE
OF UNAUTHORIZED TAX ELECTIONS ........................... 990
A. Unauthorized Tax Elections and
Their Formulation............................................... 992
B. Damages Associated with Unauthorized
Tax Elections ....................................................... 995
C. Benefits Associated with Unauthorized
Tax Elections ..................................................... 1001
II. TWO COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES ............................. 1005
A. Case Study One: Crummey Trust Provisions ... 1007
B. Case Study Two: Bypass Trust Provisions ....... 1011
C. The Uselessness of a Binary Analysis ............... 1014
III. NEED TO ADDRESS UNAUTHORIZED TAX ELECTIONS .. 1015
A. The Code’s Authorized Tax Elections ................ 1015
B. Addressing the Code’s
Unauthorized Tax Elections ............................. 1018
1. Unauthorized Tax Elections
and Their Resiliency .................................... 1018
2. Methodology to Address
Unauthorized Tax Elections ........................ 1023
CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 1027

2022]

UNAUTHORIZED TAX ELECTIONS

987

INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) is replete with
opportunities for taxpayers to make tax elections. 1 Some of
these tax elections are transformative (e.g., sanctioning the
ability to treat a corporate enterprise as a conduit entity), 2
and others are merely ministerial in nature (e.g., extending
a tax-filing deadline). 3 Despite the differing and diverse
nature of tax elections, the vast majority of them have two
central elements in common: first, prior to an election being
made, certain preconditions often must be met; and, second,
taxpayers must submit an election form to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS). 4 As evidenced by their prevalence, 5
Congress tacitly applauds the virtues of these elections,
which are easily and readily monitored, and the flexibility
that they offer taxpayers. 6
1. Numerous scholarly articles have been written on the ubiquity of tax
elections. For two of best, see Emily Cauble, Tax Elections: How to Live with
Them if We Can’t Live Without Them, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 421 (2013), and
Heather M. Field, Checking In on “Check-the-Box,” 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451 (2009)
[hereinafter Field, Checking In on “Check-the-Box”]. See also Heather M. Field,
Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in the Federal Income
Tax System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21 (2010) [hereinafter Field, Choosing Tax];
Heather M. Field, Tax Elections & Private Bargaining, 31 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2011)
[hereinafter Field, Tax Elections]; Aubree L. Helvey & Beth Stetson, The Doctrine
of Election, 62 TAX LAW. 335 (2009); George K. Yin, The Taxation of Private
Business Enterprises: Some Policy Questions Stimulated by the “Check-the-Box”
Regulations, 51 SMU L. REV. 125 (1997); Edward Yorio, The Revocability of
Federal Tax Elections, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1975).
2. See I.R.C. § 1362.
3. Id. § 6081(a).
4. See, e.g., id. § 362(e)(2)(C) (enabling a taxpayer and a corporation to which
the taxpayer contributed property to jointly elect to have the tax basis of the
taxpayer’s stock shares reduced by the amount of the embedded loss rather than
reducing the tax basis of the contributed property).
5. Cauble, supra note 1, at 423 (“Tax elections are prevalent.”); Field,
Choosing Tax, supra note 1, at 24 (“Nevertheless, explicit elections are littered
throughout the Internal Revenue Code . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
6. See Field, Choosing Tax, supra note 1, at 57 (“When the tax law is
designed to subsidize certain actions and incentivize taxpayers to undertake
those actions, explicit elections advance that social policy goal by giving
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But the same accolades accorded authorized tax
elections cannot be conferred upon unauthorized tax
elections. What exactly is an unauthorized tax election? In a
nutshell, it is usually a product of a taxpayer voluntarily
inserting technical language into a governing legal document
with the intention of securing a tax outcome not explicitly
permitted by Congress or the Treasury Department. 7 For
example, a taxpayer may add a provision to a trust
instrument permitting its beneficiaries to withdraw trust
contributions; by adding this window period of withdrawal,
such trust contributions thereby qualify for the gift tax
annual exclusion. 8
As described, unauthorized tax elections thus occupy a
unique space. On the one hand, they are not the equivalent
of abusive tax shelters that, if identified, the IRS can
challenge and, at least in many instances, defeat; 9 on the
other hand, they are not in the same camp as authorized tax
elections, which the Code and Treasury regulations sanction
taxpayers power to plan their affairs so as to achieve the best combination of
economic and tax consequences.”). Tax elections foster taxpayer autonomy and
may strengthen the overall tax system. Alice G. Abreu, Taxes, Power, and
Personal Autonomy, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 63 (1996) (“[Tax elections] reflect[]
the value of personal autonomy and the triumph of individualism over
communalism.”).
7. See, e.g., Field, Checking In on “Check-the-Box,” supra note 1, at 467–68
(“To a significant extent, the [check-the-box] regulations merely turned an
implicit election regarding entity classification (whereby taxpayers could
effectively elect entity classification through action, by including specific terms
in a business entity’s operating agreement) into an explicit election (whereby
taxpayers choose their tax treatment by filing a form with the IRS) . . . .” (footnote
omitted)).
8. Absent such a withdrawal provision, the contributed trust property would
not qualify for the annual gift tax exclusion, and gift tax imposition would be
appropriate. See infra Section II.A.
9. See Garrison Grawoig DeLee, Note, Abusive Tax Shelters: Will the Latest
Tools Really Help?, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 431, 431 (1984) (“The Treasury Department
and Congress have earnestly attacked abusive tax shelters since the early
1970’s.” (footnote omitted)); Laura Jean Kreissl & Karyn Bybee Friske, IRS
Scores Recent Judicial Successes Against Tax Shelters, 81 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES
338, 341 (2008) (listing a whole string of judicial successes that the IRS was able
to achieve against abusive tax shelters).
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and the IRS may carefully monitor. 10 Left unchecked,
unauthorized tax elections may subvert congressional intent,
deplete the Treasury of revenue, and foment public contempt
toward the Code. 11
Sound tax policy therefore requires that Congress and
the Treasury Department be attuned to the existence of
unauthorized tax elections and address them. More
specifically, once identified, on a case-by-case basis, the
nation’s legislative branch and the administrative agency
charged with oversight should craft measures that explicitly
either accept or reject them. By taking such steps, Congress
and the Treasury Department would facilitate the
achievement of the country’s legislative goals, preserve the
sanctity of the nation’s coffers, and keep the Code’s stature
intact. 12
This Article is the first of its kind to examine
unauthorized tax elections, their effects, and the ways in
which they should be navigated. Part I details the history
and nature of unauthorized tax elections. With this
background in mind, Part II presents two case studies of
unauthorized tax elections that depict their overall gray
nature—in other words, their mere existence cannot be
readily categorized as either good or bad. Next, Part III offers
a commonsense methodology of how Congress and the
Treasury Department should identify and handle
unauthorized tax elections. Finally, Part IV concludes.

10. See, e.g., Emily Cauble, Unsophisticated Taxpayers, Rules Versus
Standards, and Form Versus Substance, 52 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 329, 344 (2021) (“In
many situations, a taxpayer can make an election that will affect the tax
consequences of a transaction. Elections available to taxpayers include those that
determine how certain business entities are classified, various partnership tax
elections that determine how tax items are shared among partners or that
determine the tax consequences following transfers of partnership interests or
partnership distributions, and elections that affect the tax consequences of
certain corporate acquisitions.” (footnotes omitted)).
11. See infra Section I.B.
12. See infra Part III.
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I. THE GENESIS AND NATURE
OF UNAUTHORIZED TAX ELECTIONS
In all likelihood, since the advent of the modern income
tax more than a century ago, 13 unauthorized tax elections
have been part and parcel of the nation’s economic
landscape. 14 Out of concern that the limelight might result
in their elimination, tax practitioners have historically
sought to maintain a low profile for unauthorized tax
elections. 15 And this approach has served unauthorized tax
elections well as they sometimes exist unchallenged for years
and even decades. 16
13. Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II, 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913).
14. A fairly old law review article described a set series of potential
unauthorized elections. See Montgomery B. Angell, Tax Evasion and Tax
Avoidance, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 80, 87 (1938) (“[F]or example, the creation of
foreign personal holding companies in neighboring nations, the use of domestic
holding companies where the stock is spread sufficiently to escape the statutory
definition embracing such companies, the incorporation of yachts and country
estates, and the creation of loans between a personal holding company and the
stockholders with a view to the benefit of the interest deduction on the loans. It
is impliedly if not directly charged that such activities involve moral turpitude,
even though the transaction admittedly is quite legal in the sense that under the
existing language of the statute the transaction is not within the taxable field.”).
Unauthorized tax elections are not unique to the United States and have
probably existed for millennia. Consider the fact that in feudal France, taxes were
collected based upon how many stories a structure had below the roofline. Some
taxpayers thus “elected” to mitigate their taxes by constructing the top story of
their homes above the roofline. Emma Ailes, Hirsute Pursuit: Dodging the ‘Beard
Tax’ and Other Historical Levies, BBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.bbc.com
/news/uk-35997919 [https://perma.cc/4E33-HEA5] (“In France, houses with low
Mansard roofs were designed to shelter their occupants from taxes as well as the
elements. Property owners were taxed on the number of floors below the roof line.
The Mansard roof made the top floor essentially tax free.”).
15. By way of comparison, unlike attorneys advertising for personal injury
lawsuits and criminal defense services that dominate television and internet
advertising, there are no equivalent advertisements pertaining to unauthorized
tax elections.
16. For example, in 1940, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Helvering v.
Clifford that if a trust had too many indicia of taxpayer control, the trust should
be treated as a grantor trust, and the income it generated should be treated as
taxable to the grantor. 309 U.S. 331, 335–38 (1940). In 1946, the Treasury
Department issued the so-called Clifford regulations, T.D. 5488, 1946-1 C.B. 19,
which Congress subsequently codified into law in 1954. Internal Revenue Code
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But unauthorized tax elections embody a characteristic
unique among illicit activities. Unlike many illicit activities
(e.g., a physician prescribing OxyContin for a minor ache), a
number of unauthorized tax elections have favorable effects:
many constitute welcome engraftments to the Code; others
act as a signal to legislators that reform measures are in
order. 17 Due to unauthorized tax elections’ duality of nature
(some being harmful and others being beneficial), Congress
and the Treasury Department must thoroughly investigate
and vet them, eradicating those that are problematic and
institutionalizing those that are advantageous.
Securing a better grasp on the nature of unauthorized
tax elections requires a deeper appreciation of their genesis
and nature. Below, Section I.A details the general process of
how unauthorized tax elections come into being, Section I.B
examines the kind of damages that some unchecked
unauthorized tax elections can produce, and Section I.C
outlines the benefits that other unauthorized tax elections
can yield.
of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 671, 68A Stat. 3, 226 (1954). The regulations and
statute permitted taxpayers to form trusts that existed for more than ten years
and avoided grantor trust status. For a thorough analysis of the use of the Clifford
trust sections, see generally John W. Ervin, Income, Estate and Gift Tax Problems
in Planning Family Trusts Under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, 29 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1955). Essentially, by establishing and funding Clifford trusts, taxpayers
could “elect” to have the income that their investments generated be taxable
under the trust bracket rate structure. Four decades later, in 1986, Congress
eliminated taxpayers’ ability to make this unauthorized election to mitigate their
income tax burdens. Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 1402, 100 Stat. 2085, 2711–12.
17. As Clifford trusts grew in popularity, see Frederick R. Schneider, Which
Tax Unit for the Federal Income Tax?, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 93, 105 (1994) (“Prior
to 1986, the use of Clifford Trusts was very popular.” (footnote omitted)),
Congress recognized that the very existence of such trusts constituted an
existential threat to the integrity of the income tax system. See STAFF OF THE
JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM
ACT OF 1986, at 1248 (Comm. Print 1987) (“Congress was concerned about the tax
benefits arising under the grantor trust rules of present law. . . . In order to
reduce the tax benefits arising from the use of trusts, the Congress believe that
the so-called ‘10-year rule’ should be repealed so that a trust would be treated as
a grantor trust in all cases were [sic] there is any significant possibility that
interests and powers in the trust may become effective in the grantor after the
creation of the trust.”).
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A. Unauthorized Tax Elections and Their Formulation
Unauthorized tax elections are not a product of
spontaneous generation. They usually come into being as a
result of the following threefold process: (1) Congress enacts
tax legislation, or the Treasury Department promulgates
new regulations; (2) tax professionals respond to these
legislative and administrative issuances; and (3) under the
guidance of tax professionals, taxpayers make unauthorized
tax elections.
Consider each step in the process.
Congress enacts tax legislation, or the Treasury
Department promulgates new regulations. For public policy
reasons, Congress decides to enact legislation designed to
raise or lower taxes, broaden or narrow the tax base,
encourage or discourage particular taxpayer behaviors, or
accomplish a whole host of other possible goals (e.g., boost
capital investments). 18 Congress presumably undertakes
these legislative measures in an endeavor to raise sufficient
revenue to meet its fiscal responsibilities, 19 harboring the
expectation of taxpayer compliance with both the letter and
spirit of the law. 20 Furthermore, the Treasury Department
18. See, e.g., M. Scotland Morris, Note, Reframing the Flat Tax Debate: Three
Not-So-Easy Steps for Evaluating Radical Tax Reform Proposals, 48 FLA. L. REV.
159, 179 (1996) (“Scholars generally choose some combination of the following
objectives: revenue-raising; fairness; efficiency; simplicity; economic neutrality;
enactment of social policy; and implementation of economic policy.”).
19. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 609, 612 (1995) (“The political focus on balancing traditional tax
policymaking concerns for improving equity and economic efficiency has been
subordinated in recent legislation to reflect the overriding goal of insuring
specific annual revenue effects of proposed tax policy changes over the ‘budget
period’ . . . .”).
20. When taxpayers fail to comply with both the letter and spirit of the law,
tax loopholes emerge. Emily Cauble, Presumptions of Tax Motivation, 105 IOWA
L. REV. 1995, 2032 (2020) (“To put the point more generally, one outgrowth of the
underinclusivity of rules dictating unfavorable tax outcomes is the frequent
lament that clear rules serve as a roadmap for taxpayers who want to engage in
abusive transactions that comply with the letter, but not the spirit, of the law.”);
Noël B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA.
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issues detailed regulations to provide guidance to taxpayers
in order for them to fulfill their civic duties and compliance
obligations. 21
Tax professionals respond to these legislative and
administrative issuances. Tax professionals are not
wallflowers that react passively to tax legislation and
administrative rulings. Given the fact that the financial
livelihood of tax professionals rests on how they can assist
their clientele, they scrutinize the language of the law for
vulnerabilities that would enable their clients to achieve a
range of goals in the most efficient manner possible. As
methods of means testing, tax professionals will sometimes
lobby their clientele to submit private letter ruling requests
and to take positions that they anticipate the IRS will
challenge so that the matters will be adjudicated in court.
Taxpayers make unauthorized tax elections. When it
comes to tax planning, the vast majority of taxpayers are like
herded sheep: tax professionals render advice that most
taxpayers treat as Gospel direct from the mouth of God. 22 Put
somewhat differently, when clients consent to particular and
often obscure provisions being added to the terms of their
legal documents, most do not have the faintest idea of the

TAX REV. 1, 33 (2004) (“[P]romoters could easily concoct new abusive transactions
that literally complied with the rule.”); Andrea Monroe, What’s in a Name: Can
the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule Really Stop Partnership Tax Abuse?, 60 CASE W.
RSRV. L. REV. 401, 409 (2010) (“[T]hese flaws create a playground for those who
engage in transactions that comply with . . . literal language, yet result in tax
consequences that Congress did not contemplate.”).
21. See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (“[T]he Secretary [of the Treasury] shall prescribe all
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of [the Internal Revenue Code]
. . . .”). For an excellent discussion of how the regulatory process unfolds, see
generally Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Osofsky, Legislation and Comment: The Making of
the § 199A Regulations, 69 EMORY L.J. 209 (2019).
22. See, e.g., Heather M. Field, Offshoring Tax Ethics: The Panama Papers,
Seeking Refuge from Tax, and Tax Lawyer Referrals, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 35, 37
(2017) (describing how many “[m]ajor U.S. law firms, such as Arnold & Porter,
Kaye Scholer, Greenberg Traurig, and White & Case, and many U.S. accounting
firms” rendered advice to taxpayers seeking to utilize offshore accounts to
potentially avoid their U.S. tax obligations).
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implications associated with such verbiage. 23 Nevertheless,
as long as their tax professionals endorse these steps,
taxpayers are usually willing participants and silently
consent. 24
The foregoing threefold process associated with the
gestation of unauthorized tax elections is usually the product
of tax professionals seeking to achieve one or more taxpayer
objectives, including, but not limited to, tax mitigation, 25
administrative convenience and risk reduction, 26 and equity
23. See, e.g., Paul J. Sax, Lawyer Responsibility in Tax Shelter Opinions, 34
TAX LAW. 5, 28 (1980) (speculating that the reason more malpractice suits were
not brought against tax practitioners was because “of guilt at having invested in
a deception, embarrassment at having been fooled, and the realization that a
high-income investor caught in a tax scam holds little appeal to a civil jury”).
24. This strategy of remaining uninformed and deferential sometimes can
insulate taxpayers from potential criminal exposure. See Cheek v. United States,
498 U.S. 192, 199–200 (1991) (“The proliferation of statutes and regulations has
sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to know and comprehend the
extent of the duties and obligations imposed by the tax laws. Congress has
accordingly softened the impact of the common-law presumption by making
specific intent to violate the law an element of certain federal criminal tax
offenses. Thus, the Court almost 60 years ago interpreted the statutory term
‘willfully’ as used in the federal criminal tax statutes as carving out an exception
to the traditional rule. This special treatment of criminal tax offenses is largely
due to the complexity of the tax laws.”). In United States v. Murdock, the Court
recognized that
Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide
misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a
return, or as to the adequacy of the records he maintained, should become
a criminal by his mere failure to measure up to the prescribed standard of
conduct.
290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933).
25. See, e.g., John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Tax
Adviser Professionalism in American Society, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2721, 2730
(2016) (“[Tax shelters] were designed by tax professionals and presented to their
clients as ways to minimize tax liability, with the professionals supplying tax
opinions supporting the validity of the transactions.”).
26. See, e.g., Frank J. Vari, Practical Transfer Pricing Strategies in the
COVID Environment, 32 J. INT’L TAX’N 45, 46 (2021) (“Finance and tax
professionals should perform a detailed review of their global business operations
to mitigate transfer pricing risks and identify the transfer pricing opportunities
to help management deal with their cash and operational concerns.”).
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attainment (as lower-income taxpayers seek economic parity
with their higher-income taxpayer counterparts). 27 These
driving motivations have made unauthorized tax elections
ubiquitous throughout the tax system. 28
B. Damages Associated with Unauthorized Tax Elections
The fact that these elections are unauthorized means
that in some form or fashion, they violate the letter and/or
spirit of the Code. Put in the vernacular of tax professionals,
unauthorized tax elections constitute “work-arounds”
designed to circumvent or skirt the law. 29 As such,
unauthorized tax elections can have deleterious effects upon
the nation’s tax system. Such effects include subverting
congressional intent; depleting the Treasury of much-needed
tax revenue; and having a corrosive effect on the taxpayer
psyche, as well as fomenting public contempt toward the
Code.
Consider the fact that Congress is designed to be a
deliberative body. 30 It is supposed to contemplate multiple
27. Instead of utilizing unauthorized tax elections to mitigate their tax
burdens, some taxpayers simply fail to report their taxable income. See Richard
L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well? Congress and the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891, 917 (1987) (reviewing JEFFREY H.
BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS,
LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987)) (“Seventy-five
percent of the $100 million gap is due simply to nonreported income—the poor
person’s tax shelter—not manipulation or abuse of deduction provisions.”).
28. Such unauthorized elections compete in popularity with their
counterpart, namely, authorized elections. See sources cited supra note 1.
29. See, e.g., Gladriel Shobe, The Substance over Form Doctrine and the UpC, 38 VA. TAX REV. 249, 258 & n.37 (2018) (“The TCJA also created a new benefit
associated with the Up-C . . . because Up-C structures have the option of paying
compensation out of the Up-C’s partnership rather than out of a corporation [and
thereby securing a full compensatory deduction].”).
30. Richard A. Epstein, Why Parties and Powers Both Matter: A Separationist
Response to Levinson and Pildes, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 210, 212 (2006) (“The hardedged constitutional division between the Congress and the Executive arises
because Congress is the deliberative body, while a single President can carry out
its laws with energy and dispatch.”); Gregory S. McNeal, The Pre-NSC Origins of
National Security Expertise, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1585, 1598–99 (2012)
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dimensions to a problem and respond to stakeholders’
considerations, seeking to craft legislative initiatives that
advance positive public policy initiatives. 31 The same
psychology of accommodating the public’s needs extends to
administrative regulations promulgated by the Treasury
Department. Such regulations are typically issued after
exhaustive public hearings, which try to address the
concerns of all those who might be affected and to guide the
formulation of regulations accordingly. 32 Thus, when tax
professionals devise strategies that attempt to circumvent
legislative and administrative tax initiatives, they are often
putting their clients’ interests ahead of those of the nation.
The way in which tax professionals have made grantor
trust status “elective” illustrates this dynamic.

(“Accordingly, [the Founders] designed mechanisms within the Constitution to
address the legitimate need for unity, speed and dispatch while recognizing that
not all national security problems require expertise that is wielded with speed—
some matters may be appropriately addressed by a deliberative body like the
Congress.”).
31. See, e.g., Clifford J. White III, New Fee Guidelines Enhance Transparency
and Promote Market Forces in Billing, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 2013, at 22, 53
(“The [U.S. Trustee Program] believes that these guidelines are correct as a
matter of law and will continue to advance sound public policy as articulated by
Congress in the Bankruptcy Code.”); Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.,
469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985) (“Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946 in order to
provide national protection for trademarks used in interstate and foreign
commerce. . . . Because trademarks desirably promote competition and the
maintenance of product quality, Congress determined that a sound public policy
requires that trademarks should receive nationally the greatest protection that
can be given them. Among the new protections created by the Lanham Act were
the statutory provisions that allow a federally registered mark to become
incontestable.”(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
32. See Oei & Osofsky, supra note 21, at 220–21 (“The traditional wisdom is
that the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice-and-comment procedures
help legitimize such agency rulemaking by infusing the process with public
participation and deliberation, values that are lost when Congress delegates
regulatory decisions. Due to this perceived importance to the regulatory state,
notice and comment sits at the legal heart of agency rulemaking. Furthermore,
the E-Government Act of 2002 subjects notice and comment to electronic
publication requirements, in an effort to ensure that not only does the public have
an opportunity to comment in the notice-and-comment period, but also that such
commentary is electronically visible.” (footnotes omitted)).
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For years, taxpayers established trusts as mechanisms
to skirt their income tax obligations. 33 More specifically,
taxpayers would establish trusts and contribute incomeproducing assets to them. As a separate and independent
entity, the income that such trusts generated would then be
taxed at trust tax rates that yielded an overall lower tax
burden; 34 nevertheless, the terms of the established trusts
were designed so that taxpayers would have to sacrifice little
in the way of control over the contributed trust assets. 35 On
many occasions, the IRS would challenge the legitimacy of
such trust arrangements, claiming that because the grantor
retained control over the trust assets, the grantor, rather
than the trust, should remain taxable on the trust income. 36
IRS challenges to such taxpayer shenanigans are
epitomized in the Helvering v. Clifford case. 37 In Clifford, the
taxpayer established a short-term trust, named his wife as
trustee, contributed income-producing investment assets to
the trust, and essentially retained control over the entire

33. See Kermit E. Hundley, The Clifford Trust and Other Grantor Trusts—
From the Draftsman’s Viewpoint, 4 S. TEX. L.J. 16, 34–41 (1958) (explaining how
taxpayers could utilize trust instruments to mitigate their income tax
obligations).
34. See id. at 41–51.
35. Julian S. Bush, Short-Term Trusts: Advantages and Dangers, 24 N.Y.U.
INST. ON FED. TAX’N 317, 327 (1966).
36. See, e.g., Audano v. United States, 428 F.2d 251, 259 (5th Cir. 1970)
(“Here, factors such as taxpayer’s control of the affairs of the trusts, the short
period in which legal title to the equipment was lodged in the trusts, the grossly
excessive rentals, and the conveyance of the equipment to the partnership from
the trusts for one dollar when taxpayer quit the partnership compel our
conclusion that the trusts were not grounded in economic reality, but were
instead simply the unavailing products of imaginative minds. The trusts,
therefore, are to be treated as nullities for the purpose of determining taxpayer’s
tax liability, with the payments made to the trusts being properly treated as
income taxable to taxpayer.”); Van Zandt v. Comm’r, 341 F.2d 440, 443–44 (5th
Cir. 1965) (“The only thing accomplished was to funnel family income to children
in a way that allowed a deduction to the payor and taxation to the recipients at
reduced rates.”); Furman v. Comm’r, 381 F.2d 22, 22 (5th Cir. 1967) (“[T]he Trust
lacked ‘economic reality’, and should not be recognized for tax purposes.”).
37. See 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
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asset investment portfolio. 38 Yes, title ownership to the
assets had been changed to the trust, but nothing else of a
substantive nature had occurred; nevertheless, for taxreporting purposes, the taxpayer averred that the income
that the trust generated was subject to the lower trust
income tax rates. 39 The IRS challenged the taxpayer’s
position, and litigation ensued. After analyzing the facts of
Clifford, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the IRS.
The Court held that the indicia of taxpayer control over the
trust assets resulted in their de facto ownership by the
taxpayer, and the trust as a separate legal entity accordingly
should be ignored. 40
Years later, Congress subsequently endorsed this
outcome, providing a detailed regimen of strict rules,
embodied in Subpart E of Subchapter J of the Code, which
details the attributes of those trusts that, like the one in
Clifford, should be ignored for tax purposes (so-called
grantor trusts). 41 When grantor trust status applies, the
income that the trust generates is taxed to the grantor, not
to the trust. 42 At the time, grantor trust status thus
subverted taxpayers’ ability to capitalize upon the then lower
38. Id. at 332 (“In 1934 respondent declared himself trustee of certain
securities which he owned. All net income from the trust was to be held for the
‘exclusive benefit’ of respondent’s wife. The trust was for a term of five years,
except that it would terminate earlier on the death of either respondent or his
wife. On termination of the trust the entire corpus was to go to respondent, while
all ‘accrued or undistributed net income’ and ‘any proceeds from the investment
of such net income’ was to be treated as property owned absolutely by the wife.”).
39. Id. at 333 (“It was stipulated that . . . the ‘tax effects’ of this trust were
considered by [the taxpayer] . . . .”).
40. See id. at 335 (“In this case we cannot conclude as a matter of law that
respondent ceased to be the owner of the corpus after the trust was created.
Rather, the short duration of the trust, the fact that the wife was the beneficiary,
and the retention of control over the corpus by respondent all lead irresistibly to
the conclusion that respondent continued to be the owner for purposes of
§ 22(a).”).
41. For an excellent overview of this history, see Sherwin Kamin, Stanley S.
Surrey & William C. Warren, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Trusts, Estates
and Beneficiaries, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 1237, 1259–64 (1954).
42. See I.R.C. §§ 671–79.
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trust tax rates.
But as the Code has evolved, tax professionals’ attitudes
toward grantor trust status have radically changed. In
yesteryear, grantor trust status was generally to be avoided
because it thwarted taxpayers’ abilities to achieve their
sought-after tax minimization. However, Congress has
subsequently compressed trust tax rate brackets, making
virtually all trust income generated subject to the highest
marginal income tax rate. 43 Grantor trust status (whereby
the taxpayer, rather than the trust, is taxed on trust income
generated) is therefore no longer an anathema. To the
contrary, depending upon the circumstances, some taxpayers
now strategically pursue grantor trust status for the
following two reasons: (1) it can produce a smaller overall
income tax burden; and (2) by the grantor being burdened
with income tax responsibilities rather than the trust, the
fair market value of the trust assets may grow more rapidly,
enhancing the amount of wealth inuring to the designated
trust beneficiaries free of gift, estate, and generationskipping transfer taxes. 44
In light of the fact that grantor trusts now embody taxfavorable attributes, how can taxpayers change the status of
a traditional nongrantor irrevocable trust into a grantor
trust? One simple way is by the addition of an assetsubstitution provision in the trust instrument. 45 Vis-à-vis
43. See id. § 1(e).
44. See, e.g., Brandon A.S. Ross, Drafting Grantor Trust Powers with an Exit
Strategy, PROB. & PROP., Mar./Apr. 2013, at 34, 35 (“Grantor trust status for
irrevocable trusts has been sought for decades to take advantage of three primary
benefits of grantor trust status, other than the favorable income tax rates: (1) the
grantor effectively could make a gift in the amount of the income tax liability of
the trust assets to the beneficiaries of the trust by paying the income tax related
to the trust assets without being deemed to make a gift to the trust beneficiaries
that would be subject to gift tax; (2) the grantor could sell assets to the trust for
fair market value without recognition of gain or imposition of gift tax; and (3) the
grantor, shortly before death, could purchase or exchange low basis assets for
high basis assets without imposition of income tax.”).
45. See generally Michael D. Mulligan, Power to Substitute in Grantor Does
Not Cause Inclusion, with a Significant Caveat, 109 J. TAX’N 32 (2008) (explaining
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this provision, a grantor may switch the ownership of assets
that he owns in his individual name to the ownership of the
trust. Whether or not the substitution power is exercised, the
provision’s mere existence transforms the entire nature of
the trust from nongrantor to grantor status. 46 Thus, with the
addition of a simple provision in a governing instrument,
taxpayers may unilaterally manipulate trust status and
achieve tax outcomes never intended by Congress. 47
The subversion of congressional and Treasury
Department goals associated with unauthorized tax elections
thus often comes at the steep price tag of forgone tax
revenue. In the case of taxpayers utilizing grantor trust
status to minimize their income and transfer tax obligations,
for example, billions of dollars of tax revenue could be at risk
of being forfeited. Admittedly, estimating this dollar amount
is an imprecise exercise: the Code explicitly permits
taxpayers to avail themselves of this technique (i.e.,
conferring grantor trust status on irrevocable trusts); 48
therefore, the revenue loss associated with this unauthorized
tax election will not appear as part of the IRS’s tax gap
measurement computations. 49 Only educated speculation
leads to the revenue loss conclusion: due to the utilization of
how a power of substitution may be employed to create grantor trust status).
46. See I.R.C. § 675(4)(C).
47. See generally Daniel L. Ricks, I Dig It, But Congress Shouldn’t Let Me:
Closing the IDGT Loophole, 36 ACTEC L.J. 641 (2010) (discussing how taxpayers
manipulate grantor trust status in order to circumvent their transfer tax
obligations).
48. See id. at 643 (“[Affording grantor trust status to irrevocable trusts] is
antithetical to a transfer tax system and Congress never intended that the tax
law would sanction [transactions involving them]. In fact, many estate planners
believe that the unintended tax benefits created by the Internal Revenue Code in
favor of society’s wealthiest individuals provide low-hanging fruit for federal
revenue generation.”).
49. Instead, tax gap studies routinely explore the problems of nonfilers and
those who underreport. See, e.g., BARRY W. JOHNSON & PETER J. ROSE, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR
TAX YEARS 2011–2013, §§ 4.1–4.2 (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1415
.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8GW-HVL7].
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this technique by a multitude of taxpayers, significant tax
savings must be at stake, and substantial revenue
hemorrhaging is unfolding. 50
Beyond the tangible of revenue forfeiture is the
intangible of how unauthorized tax elections spur derision
directed toward the Code. This is a two-sided coin: on the one
hand, those taxpayers who make unauthorized tax elections
anecdotally smirk when following the advice of their tax
professionals, often incredulous that the insertion of a few
words in a governing document can have such a dramatic tax
effect; on the other hand, those taxpayers who are
bystanders to those making unauthorized tax elections often
feel that they are chumps for not taking advantage of the
system themselves. 51 From either vantage point, the picture
presented is not pretty and is likely to erode taxpayer
confidence in and compliance with the nation’s tax system.
C. Benefits Associated with Unauthorized Tax Elections
In reading the last Section of this analysis, one might
reasonably think that unauthorized tax elections are nothing
short of public policy debacles. However, this could not be
50. There are numerous articles written about such trusts; and judging by
their titles alone, one can gather that they produce sizable tax savings. See, e.g.,
Rachna D. Balakrishna, Defective Grantor Trusts: Greater Flexibility and Income
Tax Leverage, 32 EST. PLAN., Dec. 2005, at 30; Kuno S. Bell, Use Defective Grantor
Trusts for an Effective Triple Play, 75 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 12 (2005); Howard
M. Larsen, Defective Grantor Trusts Can Be Boon in Asset Protection and Estate
Planning, ORANGE CNTY. LAW., Apr. 1999, at 18.
51. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Economics of Strong
Reciprocity, in MORAL SENTIMENTS & MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 151, 167 (Herbert Gintis et al. eds., 2005) (“[I]f
people believe that cheating on taxes, corruption, or abuses of the welfare state
are widespread, they themselves are more likely to cheat on taxes, take bribes,
or abuse welfare state institutions.”); Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of
Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX
REV. 155, 199 (1996) (theorizing that “when we hear about Leona Helmsley
evading taxes and going to jail, some of us say to ourselves ‘we had better pay our
taxes,’ but many others tend to engage in an internal dialogue that sounds more
like ‘this rich woman evaded her taxes; from what I hear, most other rich people
do, and probably I should or I’ll be losing out’”).
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further from the truth. Instead, they constitute important
signals to Congress and the Treasury Department that
something is askew, warranting attention. 52 If the legislative
branch and the agency charged with overseeing taxpayer
compliance are attuned to the existence of these elections,
their very presence may prove constructive.
An example illustrates this point.
The Code defines corporate entities to include
“associations.” 53 For decades, the governing regulations
identified a set of six criteria linked with being an association
(i.e., associates, business objective, continuity of life,
centralized management, limited liability, and free
transferability of interests). 54 Business enterprises that had
a majority of these attributes (i.e., at least four) were deemed
associations, taxable as corporations; and those with fewer
were not, taxable instead as partnerships, proprietorships,
or trusts. 55 To avoid corporate status and its concomitant tax
burdens, many taxpayers, with the assistance of their tax
advisers, inserted provisions in their operating documents to
safeguard against this. 56 This legal footwork often was

52. This is the exact converse of those situations when the government nudges
taxpayers to engage in particular behaviors that society deems optimal. See
generally Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Taxing Nudges, 107 VA. L. REV. 571 (2021)
(describing how Congress should tax governmental nudges).
53. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3).
54. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1996) (pre-amendment in 1997).
55. See id.
56. See, e.g., Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372, 376 (6th Cir. 2007)
(“These unincorporated business entities had the characteristics of both
corporations and partnerships, combining ease of management with limited
liability, and were increasingly structured with the Kintner regulations in mind,
in order to take advantage of whatever classification was thought to be the most
advantageous.”); see also Field, Checking In on “Check-the-Box,” supra note 1, at
463 (“[G]iven the bright line rules set forth in the Kintner regulations and the
flexibility afforded under the applicable state business statutes, practitioners
were often able to create LLCs and other business entities with a carefully
tailored set of rights and responsibilities so as to achieve tax classification as
either a corporation or a partnership, as desired by the client, while retaining
significant features of the other classification.”).
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expensive, resource-intensive, and time-consuming—and a
simple verbiage mishap could prove to be a tax detriment. 57
After decades unfolded, during which there were
multiple court challenges and the issuance of thousands of
pages of private letter rulings authenticating the tax status
of various business enterprises (constituting de facto
unauthorized elections), 58 the Treasury Department came to
the belated, but enlightened, conclusion not only that these
drafting exercises were a waste of time and resources for
taxpayers but also that government oversight was an
exercise in futility. That being the case, the Treasury
Department, on its own initiative, devised what are known
as check-the-box regulations, which permit taxpayers to
essentially decide the tax status of the business enterprises
they establish without the omnipresent threat of being
second-guessed by the IRS. 59 In lieu of spending countless
hours and enduring hefty professional fees to secure a
desired tax outcome, going forward, taxpayers may instead
rely on a set of pro-taxpayer default rules or, alternatively,
complete a simple one-page election form that grants almost
complete discretion to them to choose the tax status of the
business enterprises that they form. 60
57. See, e.g., Rod Garcia, Treasury Officials Address Check-the-Box Entities,
67 TAX NOTES 1009, 1009 (1995) (According to a Treasury official, “[i]t’s a resource
allocation question. . . . Too many resources have been wasted both by the IRS
and the private sector in resolving classification issues, even though in the end
the taxpayer gets the desired status. . . . Classification becomes a very intricate
game that if you have counsel[,] you get out of the maze and you’re home free.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
58. See Field, Checking In on “Check-the-Box,” supra note 1, at 464
(“Presumably, taxpayers also incurred significant legal fees in obtaining advice
on these classification issues. Further, the Service noted that small businesses
could be particularly hard hit by the considerable costs of obtaining advice
regarding how to structure business entities to obtain the most favorable
combination of state law and tax treatment.”).
59. See Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989,
21,990 (proposed May 13, 1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301).
60. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 105TH CONG., REVIEW OF SELECTED ENTITY
CLASSIFICATION AND PARTNERSHIP TAX ISSUES 17 (Comm. Print 1997) (noting that
“[t]he principal impact is that taxpayers may now choose with greater simplicity
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The check-the-box regulations are emblematic of the
trifold signaling value of unauthorized tax elections.
Fulfilling public policy goals. For starters, by calling
attention to legislative or administrative shortcomings
associated with statutory or administrative prose,
unauthorized tax elections can direct Congress toward the
fulfillment of public policy goals. As a general axiom,
Congress seeks to make economic growth as robust as
possible. Therefore, whenever the nation’s legislative body
perceives an impediment to such growth, it seeks to eradicate
it. In line with this orientation, the Treasury Department
follows the same script. When the Treasury Department thus
analyzed how the choice-of-entity issues might be retarding
economic growth, it took a bold measure—the issuance of the
check-the-box regulations—to foster the long-standing
congressional goal of facilitating business formations.
Safeguarding the nation’s coffers and reducing
deadweight economic losses. Another signaling value of
unauthorized tax elections is safeguarding the nation’s
coffers and reducing the deadweight economic losses
associated with tax planning. 61 Once an unauthorized tax
and lower compliance costs whether they will pay two levels of tax on business
income under the corporate tax rules, or whether they will pay only one level of
tax under the partnership tax rules”); Susan Pace Hamill, The Taxation of
Domestic Limited Liability Companies and Limited Partnerships: A Case for
Eliminating the Partnership Classification Regulations, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 565,
600 (1995) (The new check-the-box regulations “save both taxpayers and the
Service an enormous, if largely unmeasurable, amount of transaction costs.
Without having to seek expensive advice or use the Service’s resources, persons
deciding among the major domestic entities—the corporation, the partnership,
and the LLC—can be absolutely certain of the tax treatment of their entity.”
(footnote omitted)); Victor E. Fleischer, Note, “If It Looks like a Duck”: Corporate
Resemblance and Check-the-Box Elective Tax Classification, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
518, 531–32 (1996) (commenting that the check-in-the-box regulations “reduce[]
the transaction costs of closely examining local law when organizing a business
venture”).
61. See, e.g., Brant J. Hellwig, Questioning the Wisdom of Patent Protection
for Tax Planning, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1005, 1007 (2007) (“[T]ax planning creates
deadweight loss to society through distortions in taxpayer behavior and
transaction costs that do not contribute to the public fisc.”); Alex Raskolnikov,
The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 601,
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election has entered the ambit of public awareness,
politicians and tax administrators have the opportunity to
change the governing law or administrative regulations in
one of two ways: eradicating pernicious elections or
embracing salutary ones. Either action yields positive
outcomes insofar as fisc drainage is plugged and taxpayers
do not spend countless sums of money on legal and
accounting fees developing work-arounds.
Preserving the Code’s stature. A third and final byproduct of addressing unauthorized tax elections is that
doing so helps keep the Code’s stature intact. There are
numerous empirical studies indicating that tax compliance
is infectious: taxpayers are more prone to be compliant if
they believe that fellow taxpayers are compliant; and the
exact opposite is also true, that is, if taxpayers perceive a
lack of fellow taxpayer compliance, they are more prone to be
noncompliant as well. 62 The fact that unauthorized tax
elections are just that—namely, unauthorized—means that
their existence is likely to breed contempt toward the tax
system by both participants and nonparticipants. Remedial
action will allay such contempt.
II. TWO COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES
Unauthorized tax elections serve a useful signaling
purpose to nudge politicians and tax administrators alike
that something is amiss that requires reform. In some
instances, reform will be necessary to purge unauthorized
tax elections that are pernicious and subversive in nature; in
643 (2007) (“In general, tax planning is inefficient because tax-motivated changes
in behavior produce deadweight losses.”); David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About
Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 222 (2002) (“Tax planning is . . . almost always
positively bad for society . . . .”).
62. See Robert H. Frank, Without More Enforcement, Tax Evasion Will
Spread Like a Virus, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
10/30/business/tax-evasion-virus-IRS.html
[https://perma.cc/4TZB-3LLX]
(explaining how tax noncompliance can prove infectious between and among
taxpayers, causing even those inclined to be tax compliant to lose their
grounding).
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other instances, reform will be necessary to formally
institutionalize those unauthorized tax elections that
enhance and strengthen the nation’s tax system.
Below, this analysis presents a comparative case study
depicting two unauthorized tax elections: Section II.A
overviews an unauthorized tax election involving so-called
Crummey trust formation, and Section II.B details an
unauthorized tax election regarding so-called bypass trust
utilization. Some commentators might be inclined to label
the former a “bad” election insofar as it provides a direct
bridge that enables taxpayers to circumvent their gift tax
obligations, 63 and to label the latter a “good” election insofar
as it enables each spouse of a married couple to make use of
his/her estate tax exemption amount. 64 However, what this
analysis reveals in Section II.C is that such dichotomous
labeling is misplaced and an exercise in dangerous
oversimplification.

63. See, e.g., Bradley E.S. Fogel, The Emperor Does Not Need Clothes—The
Expanding Use of “Naked” Crummey Withdrawal Powers to Obtain Federal Gift
Tax Annual Exclusions, 73 TUL. L. REV. 555, 555 (1998) (“The federal gift tax
annual exclusion allows a donor to give $10,000 per calendar year [(currently,
$15,000 per calendar year)] to an unlimited number of individuals free of gift tax.
The exclusion is unavailable for gifts of ‘future interests.’ Most gifts in trust are
at least partially future interests, therefore the exclusion is unavailable for these
gifts. In order to make a gift trust that qualifies for the federal gift tax annual
exclusion to withdraw the gift from the trust, the donee may be given a temporary
power called a Crummey power.”).
64. See, e.g., Stewart J. Beyerle, Bypass Trusts Can Maximize Unified Credit,
18 EST. PLAN. 212, 213 (1991) (“[W]hen the first spouse dies, his or her portion of
the assets is first allocated to an irrevocable bypass trust up to the $600,000
exemption amount of the unified credit, and any excess is allocated to the marital
deduction trust. As a result, there will be no estate tax on the death of the first
spouse. The value of the bypass trust, including any appreciation thereon, will
also escape estate taxation on the death of the surviving spouse.”).
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A. Case Study One: Crummey Trust Provisions
By way of background, in 1924, in order to safeguard the
integrity of the estate tax, Congress enacted a gift tax. 65
Taxpayers could no longer circumvent their estate tax
burdens simply by making significant lifetime transfers. 66
For reasons of administrative convenience, however,
Congress introduced the gift tax annual exclusion. 67 This
exclusion enables taxpayers to make present-interest
transfers, such as birthday and graduation gifts, free from
gift tax, thereby negating the need for any record-keeping
and filing submissions. 68 In contrast, all future-interest
gifts—that is, those that do not immediately vest in the name
of a designated beneficiary—are included in the gift tax
base. 69
When making gifts, trust usage is commonplace. The
reasons for trust popularity are multifaceted. Trusts are
excellent vehicles by which grantors can preserve and
safeguard contributed trust assets, which are managed and
invested by investment-savvy trustees and, in many
instances, distributed at a later point in time to one or more

65. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 319–24, 43 Stat. 253, 313–16.
66. See Estate of Sanford v. Comm’r, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939) (“An important,
if not the main, purpose of the gift tax was to prevent or compensate for avoidance
of death taxes . . . .”).
67. See H.R. REP. NO. 72-708, at 29 (1932) (“[The annual exclusion] on the one
hand, is to obviate the necessity of keeping an account of and reporting numerous
small gifts, and, on the other, to fix the amount sufficiently large to cover in most
cases wedding and Christmas gifts and occasional gifts of relatively small
amounts.”); see also S. REP. NO. 72-665, at 41 (1932) (“Such exemption, on the one
hand, is to obviate the necessity of keeping an account of and reporting numerous
small gifts, and, on the other, to fix the amount sufficiently large to cover in most
cases wedding and Christmas gifts and occasional gifts of relatively small
amounts.”).
68. See I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1).
69. Id. (“In the case of gifts (other than gifts of future interests in property)
made to any person by the donor during the calendar year, the first $10,000 of
such gifts to such person shall not, for purposes of [the gift tax] be included in the
total amount of gifts made during such year.” (emphasis added)).
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designated trust beneficiaries. 70 Indeed, trusts are designed
to protect trust beneficiaries from themselves (in terms of
overspending), as well as from evil and conniving spouses
and overly rambunctious creditors. 71
By their very nature, virtually all trust contributions
theoretically constitute future interests and, as such, endure
gift tax exposure. However, to safeguard against gift tax
imposition, tax professionals devised a clever transfer taxminimization scheme. With respect to trusts that they were
tasked to draft, they engrafted provisions that permitted
trust beneficiaries a limited window period to immediately
withdraw contributed trust funds. 72 The agenda associated
with adding such withdrawal window periods was simple: to
transform what otherwise would be a future interest—and
thus subject to gift tax exposure—into a present interest that
qualified for the annual gift tax exclusion. 73
Over a half century ago, in Crummey v. Commissioner, 74
the IRS challenged an important element related to the
viability of this technique. The agency claimed that,
notwithstanding the existence of withdrawal provisions, in
those situations in which minors were the designated trust
beneficiaries and no guardians had been appointed on their
behalf, trust contributions were future interests; as such,
these trust contributions could not qualify for the gift tax
70. See generally AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER &
MARK L. ASCHER, SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 2.1 (5th ed. 2006).
71. See Allison Tait, Trusting Marriage, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 199, 215 (2019)
(“Trusts have traditionally played a key role in this planning, prized for their
ability to protect assets from creditors, including spouses.”).
72. For an excellent discussion of the origins and use of so-called Crummey
withdrawal powers, which form the basis of this window period, see generally
Bradley E.S. Fogel, Back to the Future Interest: The Origin and Questionable
Legal Basis of the Use of Crummey Withdrawal Powers to Obtain the Federal Gift
Tax Annual Exclusion, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 189 (2003).
73. See id. at 194 n.20 (“Based on Crummey withdrawal powers held by the
beneficiaries, gifts to the trust are considered gifts of present interests that may
be offset by the federal gift tax annual exclusion.”).
74. 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
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annual exclusion. 75 The Tax Court agreed with the IRS’s
analysis, ruling in the agency’s favor, 76 and the taxpayer
appealed.
Years earlier, in Fondren v. Commissioner, 77 the
Supreme Court held that gifts made to an irrevocable trust
for the grantor’s minor grandchildren, where the terms of the
trust required that income and corpus be accumulated and
were not to be distributed until such time as each grandchild
reached age twenty-five, constituted future-interest gifts and
hence were taxable. 78 To avoid the fate of the taxpayers in
Fondren and the disqualification of their trust contributions
from the gift tax annual exclusion, tax professionals opted to
add window periods coupled with beneficiary withdrawal
rights to trust documents. Courts routinely upheld the
validity of these devices as being bona fide mechanisms to
make trust contributions into present interests that qualified
for the gift tax annual exclusion. 79
Still, on appeal in Crummey, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit wrestled with the fact that the
taxpayer’s minor children were not likely to exercise this
75. Id. at 83 (“This determination was based upon the Commissioner’s belief
that the portion of the gifts in trust for the children under the age of 21 were
‘future interests’ which are disallowed under § 2503(b).”).
76. See Crummey v. Comm’r, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 772 (1966), aff’d, 397 F.2d 82
(9th Cir. 1968).
77. 324 U.S. 18 (1945).
78. Id. at 28–29 (“The graduated scale of payments, beginning at age twentyfive and ending at thirty-five, together with the prohibition of payment earlier
except in case of necessity, shows principal concern for a period of adult life. And,
from the fact that this would be the period when the grandchildren normally
would be assuming family responsibilities of their own, the inference well might
be drawn that the chief purpose was to give aid and some security in that time.
The contingent provision, in case of earlier need, cannot be taken therefore to
represent the donors’ primary concern as expressed in the instruments. Cf.
Fisher v. [Comm’r], 132 F.2d 383, 386 [(9th Cir. 1942)]. But, whether so or not, in
the particular circumstances that need was but a contingency to be realized, if at
all, in the future. And, until realized, the contingency stood squarely in the way
of any child’s receiving a single dollar from the fund.”).
79. For an excellent analysis of these cases, see generally Fogel, supra note
63.
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withdrawal right. 80 Nevertheless, as expressed by the Ninth
Circuit, “as a technical matter, we think a minor could make
the demand.” 81 This legal technicality sufficed to convince
the court to rule in the taxpayer’s favor. 82
The court’s imprimatur of approval launched a stampede
of eager taxpayers anxious to utilize this technique, which,
decades later, shows no signs of abating. Now, almost
without exception, the terms of virtually every irrevocable
trust contain these provisions, permitting the wholesale use
of these de facto unauthorized tax elections in which
taxpayers opt to make their otherwise future-interest trust
contributions into present-interest ones.
Like many other unauthorized tax elections, Crummey
trust provisions may wreak havoc. They subvert the
legislative intent of providing a mechanism for relatively
small annual gifts to be made absent the need to file transfer
tax returns; their use shrinks the transfer tax base; and, to
the general public, their presence makes the Code appear
absurd because of the transformative nature of the addition
of a few seemingly meaningless words. 83 And Crummey trust
provisions do not exist on the dark web; unlike clandestine
tax shelters of the past, both the public and Congress are well
aware of the existence of this technique. 84 Such toleration
80. See Crummey, 397 F.2d at 86–87.
81. Id. at 87.
82. Id. at 88.
83. John L. Peschel, Major Recent Tax Developments in Estate Planning, in
33 U. S. CAL. L. CTR. TAX INST. ch. 14, ¶ 1401.02 (1981) (“[T]he Crummey power,
in theory, has a strong legal basis but, in practice, emits an equally strong odor
of sham.”); see Willard H. Pedrick, Crummey Is Really Crummy!, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
943, 948 (“[T]he [Crummey] withdrawal right is transparently a flim flam.”);
Benjamin N. Henszey, Crummey Power Revisited, 59 TAXES 76, 77 (1981) (“[T]he
IRS is aware that the [Crummey] power is a sham in most cases . . . .”); DEP’T OF
THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S REVENUE
PROPOSALS 130 (1998), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/131/General-Expla
nations-FY1999.pdf [https://perma.cc/CS5J-TZ49] (stating that “the Crummey
power is essentially a legal fiction”).
84. A Google search of the phrase “Crummey trust” yields about 95,600
results. GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/search?q=Crummey+trust [https://
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suggests that, at least in the minds of those in power, the
proposed fix of disqualifying all trust contributions from
exclusion from the gift tax base may prove worse than the
problem itself, which excludes the majority of trust
contributions from the gift tax base.
B. Case Study Two: Bypass Trust Provisions
From inception, the nation’s estate tax always included
a fairly significant exemption that insulated the vast
majority of taxpayers’ estates from its imposition. 85 This
exemption, however, was granted on a taxpayer-by-taxpayer
basis (i.e., married couples were not treated as a single
economic unit). That being the case, a common estate
planning strategy quickly emerged. In order to secure the use
of both spouses’ exemption amounts, on the death of the first
spouse, the decedent spouse would establish a so-called
bypass trust that was designed to absorb the decedent
spouse’s unused estate tax exemption amount; and upon the
surviving spouse’s demise, the bypass trust assets would not
be included in the surviving spouse’s estate (hence, the
moniker bypass). 86
An example illustrates how taxpayers use bypass trust
assets to capitalize upon the use of each spouse’s estate tax
exemption amount.
Consider the plight of married couple Spouse A and
Spouse B. Assume that each has $10 million of assets in
his/her respective name, the prevailing estate tax exemption
is $10 million, and the estate tax rate is forty percent.
Suppose further that Spouse A dies and bequeaths his entire
estate to Spouse B. Due to the unlimited estate tax marital
perma.cc/S84K-PYYB] (last visited May 28, 2022) (search “Crummey trust”).
85. See generally Jay A. Soled, The Federal Estate Tax Exemption and the
Need for Its Reduction, 47 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 649, 652–59 (2020) (exploring the
history of the federal estate tax exemption).
86. See generally Beyerle, supra note 64 (explaining the virtues of bypass
trust use to capitalize upon each spouse’s unified credit exemption amount).
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deduction, 87 at his demise, no estate tax would apply (i.e.,
$10 million gross estate minus $10 million of assets passing
to the decedent’s surviving spouse). However, at Spouse B’s
demise, she would have a $20 million gross estate ($10
million from her husband’s estate plus $10 million of her
own), generating a $4 million estate tax (i.e., [$20 million
(gross estate) – $10 million (exemption)] x 0.4).
Compare the foregoing outcome with the following set of
facts: Spouse A “elects” to insert certain provisions in his will
that would result in the establishment of a bypass trust at
his demise. He subsequently dies, and, under the terms of his
will, his $10 million of assets flow into a bypass trust;
furthermore, Spouse A designates Spouse B as the trustee of
the bypass trust; trust income is distributed annually to her;
and corpus distributions are made to her and/or her children
in accordance with an ascertainable standard (for their
health,
education,
maintenance,
and
support).
Notwithstanding the vast amount of latitude that Spouse B
has with regard to the trust assets, their value is not
included in her gross estate upon her demise, because she
has no direct control over them. That being the case, due to
the assumed estate tax exemption amount, her gross estate
would escape estate tax entirely because it would equal $10
million: her original assets would not be augmented by the
assets held by the bypass trust, so the family unit would be
able to save $4 million of estate tax.
For decades, bypass trust utilization was standard fare
in the estate planning world. 88 But this unauthorized tax
87. I.R.C. § 2056(a).
88. See Glen T. Eichelberger & Brian P. Teaff, Bypass Trusts: Obsolete
Bygones or Too Good to Pass Up, 40 EST. PLAN. 2, 3 (2013) (“[Prior to portability
of the estate tax exemption amount], it was generally impossible for a married
couple’s estate plan to avoid some degree of complexity to ensure tax efficiency
because a spouse’s estate tax exemption amount was a ‘use it or lose it’
proposition.”); Jay A. Soled, A Proposal to Make Credit Shelter Trusts Obsolete, 51
TAX LAW. 83, 83 (1997) (“Since the introduction of the unified credit in 1976,
married couples who attempt to minimize transfer taxes and maximize the
wealth passing to their heirs have generally been plagued by an expensive and
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election carried a steep price tag. Year after year, trustees
had to complete and file annual trust income tax returns
(Form 1041s); the IRS had to process and monitor such
returns for their accuracy; and surviving spouses sometimes
had to deal with not-so-accommodating trustees who could
demand steep fiduciary commissions. 89 And what did this
entire exercise have to show for itself? A lot of paper shuffling
to achieve an objective that was already commonplace under
the Code—namely, treating married spouses as a single
economic unit. 90
Approximately a decade ago, Congress finally responded
to the insidious avalanche of bypass trust formation. It chose
to make the estate tax exemption portable between spouses
so that upon one spouse’s demise, the surviving spouse could
automatically receive the decedent spouse’s exemption
amount. 91 This reform eradicated the need for thousands and
thousands of trusts to be formed—and eliminated the
silliness that this entire exercise engendered.

burdensome exercise. In order for each spouse to optimize the use of his or her
unified credit under the Code and to promote the economic well-being of the
surviving spouse, the last will and testament of each spouse, using technical
formulas and special terms of art, must establish a testamentary trust for the
benefit of the surviving spouse. Known in tax parlance as credit shelter or bypass
trusts, these trusts, if properly structured, are intended to shield the assets of
the first decedent spouse from inclusion in the gross estate of the surviving
spouse.” (footnote omitted)).
89. See Soled, supra note 88, at 92–94 (discussing the administrative costs to
the government and taxpayers regarding bypass trust utilization).
90. See Angela V. Langlotz, Tying the Knot: The Tax Consequences of
Marriage, 54 TAX LAW. 329, 332 (2001) (“Following the 1948 codification of filing
joint returns, married couples with a given income paid exactly the same tax,
regardless of which spouse earned the income or what proportion of household
income was attributable to each.”).
91. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 303(a), 124 Stat. 3296, 3302–03 (enacting Code
§ 2010(c), which permits portability of decedent spouse’s unused estate tax
exemption).
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C. The Uselessness of a Binary Analysis
Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, framing
unauthorized tax elections in a binary fashion as being either
good or bad is overly simplistic and inherently flawed. On the
surface, some unauthorized tax elections (e.g., bypass trust
utilization) appear to offer a method to achieve
administrative goals and have an aura of wholesomeness
about them; 92 conversely, those unauthorized tax elections
(e.g., Crummey withdrawal powers) that are specifically
designed to achieve tax minimization have a suspect quality
about them. 93
But categorizing unauthorized tax elections in this
good/bad manner smacks of superficiality. The so-called bad
unauthorized tax elections are not necessarily corrupt
insofar as they inform Congress and the Treasury
Department that the tax system is possibly burdened with
meaningless metrics (distinguishing between present and
future interests) or saddled with anachronistic structural
features of years past (retaining grantor trust status
predicated on an erstwhile trust tax bracket rate structure
that no longer exists). By the same token, conceptualizing socalled good unauthorized tax elections as being purely
virtuous in nature is misplaced; it misses the mark in that
their utilization enables tax professionals to prey on
taxpayers’ ignorance and to make huge fees along the way.
What this comparative study thus informs and
reinforces is the notion that an unauthorized tax election is
neither an unadulterated positive nor an unadulterated
negative. The one thing that can be said with any confidence

92. For example, so-called good unauthorized elections might include those
provisions designed to fulfill choice of business entity requirements or,
alternatively, bypass trust utilization.
93. For example, so-called bad unauthorized elections might include the
insertion of a power of substitution to achieve grantor trust status or,
alternatively, Crummey withdrawal provisions that enable trust contributions to
qualify for the gift tax annual exclusion.
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is that the existence of an unauthorized tax election
warrants immediate attention: left unattended, such
elections can gradually corrode the integrity of the tax
system; by contrast, if timely addressed, their existence can
guide meaningful guidance and reform.
III. NEED TO ADDRESS UNAUTHORIZED TAX ELECTIONS
Because Congress does not know the economic and
personal plights of each taxpayer, it often permits them to
make important tax decisions via a myriad of approved tax
elections. 94 In this manner, Congress enables the Code to
shed its otherwise monolithic aura, making it far less likely
to be perceived by the general public as being Procrustean in
nature.
Below, Section III.A explores the nature of the Code’s
authorized elections and their utility. Based upon this
template, Section III.B next details how Congress and the
Treasury Department need to address and respond to
unauthorized tax elections.
A. The Code’s Authorized Tax Elections
Tax elections punctuate the Code and serve a multitude
of purposes: sometimes they alleviate the need for
burdensome record keeping; 95 other times they can reduce
the costs that taxpayers incur to be tax compliant; 96 still
other times their utilization facilitates business
94. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
95. For example, taxpayers may elect to use a standard mileage deduction
instead of having to keep exhaustive records of how much they spend on items
such as gasoline, tolls, and insurance to maintain their automobiles for business
use. Rev. Proc. 2019-46, § 4, 2019-49 I.R.B. 1301. When it comes to home office
expenses, the IRS permits taxpayers to elect a simplified safe harbor method for
determining a taxpayer’s deductible home office expenses. Rev. Proc. 2013-13,
§ 1, 2013-6 I.R.B. 478; I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-5 (Jan. 15, 2013).
96. For example, to alleviate the costs associated with tax compliance,
Congress permits taxpayers to elect a tax year other than the required tax year
in order to exact lower fees from their tax professionals. I.R.C. § 444(a).
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transactions; 97 and, finally, tax elections provide plainvanilla opportunities for taxpayers to save taxes. 98 And tax
elections are not some new phenomenon: soon after the
introduction of the modern income tax in 1913, Congress
began to make tax elections part and parcel of the Code’s
fabric. 99
Gauged at least by their pervasiveness, tax elections
have many virtues. For example, their features add elements
of flexibility to the Code, enabling taxpayers to carry on their
daily affairs with as little tax-related intrusiveness as
possible. 100 Furthermore, other tax elections have the
capacity to make the Code more equitable in nature. 101 While
politicians from both sides of the political aisle often find
themselves at odds regarding policy issues, when it comes to
tax elections, Democrats and Republicans generally come
together, as evidenced by the fact there exists no legislative
history of a proposed tax election spawning legislative
controversy.
But not all share this Pollyannaish view of tax elections.
There are several commentators who harbor misgivings
regarding the existence of these elections. 102 Chief among
97. For example, taxpayers may purchase a partnership interest (rather than
the assets of the partnership) and still secure a tax basis in the partnership’s
assets equal to fair market value. See id. § 754. A similar election can be made
regarding the purchase of a corporate equity interest. See id. § 338(a).
98. The executor of a decedent’s estate may elect to value all of the property
in the gross estate as of the date six months after the decedent’s death. Id.
§ 2032(a).
99. For example, the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 permitted taxpayers to
elect an extension of time to file their income tax returns. I.R.C. § 53(a)(2) (1939)
(53 Stat. 28); see also Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 240, 42 Stat. 227, 260
(current version at I.R.C. § 1501 (2006)) (filing of consolidated returns was
electable); Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 223, 40 Stat. 1057, 1074 (1919) (allowing
certain married couples to file jointly).
100. See supra note 95.
101. See supra note 98 (enabling the executor of a decedent’s estate to avoid
bearing an estate tax on wealth that no longer exists).
102. See, e.g., Cauble, supra note 1, at 489 (“Tax elections are harmful.”); Field,
Choosing Tax, supra note 1, at 26 (“Many tax academics seem to have an
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their concerns is that tax elections add an unwelcome
dimension of complexity to the Code, 103 often requiring
sophisticated tax counsel to help guide the decision-making
process. 104 Because many taxpayers lack the resources to
secure such advice, they cannot make tax-savvy decisions,
putting them at a distinct disadvantage relative to those
with greater financial resources. 105 In addition, tax elections
can sap the nation’s fisc of much-needed revenue. 106
Notwithstanding the just-articulated virtues and
misgivings associated with tax elections, a key reason why
they are so important to the tax system is that they supply
Congress and the Treasury Department with vital
information. Instead of taxpayers trying to make these
elections on their own (via the unauthorized tax election
route), a qualification for Code-authorized tax elections is
that taxpayers must disclose their choices by submitting
designated election forms. 107 These election forms enable the
IRS to better police compliance and enable Congress and the
Treasury Department to garner critical information about
tax trends and compliance concerns, which empowers both
the legislative and administrative branches of government to
execute constructive responses.

instinctive distaste for explicit elections in the tax system.”); Yin, supra note 1,
at 130 (“If the taxpayer is well-advised, [every tax] election, which has
ramifications for tax purposes only, will always be to the detriment of the fisc.”).
103. See Cauble, supra note 1, at 447 (“[T]ax elections generate complexity.”).
104. See id. at 423 (“[A]n unsophisticated couple who is unaware of the election
may fail to obtain beneficial tax treatment.”).
105. See Field, Choosing Tax, supra note 1, at 31 (“[A]n election, while
technically available to all eligible taxpayers, may be functionally available only
to the wealthiest, most sophisticated group of taxpayers, who can best navigate
the complexity of the election process.”).
106. Id. at 30 (“[I]t is virtually axiomatic to say that explicit elections reduce
tax revenue.”).
107. See id. at 28 (“Once the technical requirements for making an election are
determined, the taxpayer must prepare and file the election accordingly.”).
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B. Addressing the Code’s Unauthorized Tax Elections
Ideally, the life cycle of an unauthorized tax election
should be as follows: Congress enacts a new law or the
Treasury Department promulgates a new Treasury
regulation; tax professionals develop an unauthorized tax
election, bring it into the public domain, and empower
taxpayers to achieve tax outcomes that neither the
legislative nor administrative branch of government
anticipated or intended; and then the governing law or the
Treasury regulation in question is amended in a manner that
eradicates the unauthorized tax election or, alternatively,
incorporates it into the Code.
Notwithstanding this supposed ideal, Section III.B.1
explores why this imaginary life cycle does not ordinarily
exist, and Section III.B.2 then prescribes an enlightened
methodology to address unauthorized tax elections.
1. Unauthorized Tax Elections and Their Resiliency
Both the public and academic commentators often
express surprise and dismay at the elongated shelf life of
many unauthorized tax elections. Many times, it is years,
and in some cases decades, before Congress addresses the
problem of specific unauthorized tax elections. 108 And the
108. See Field, Checking In on “Check-the-Box,” supra note 1, at 464–65 (“Since
the issuance of Revenue Ruling 88-76 [Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (dealing
with entity classification issues)], the Service issued seventeen revenue rulings,
several revenue procedures, and numerous letter rulings on entity classification
issues. Presumably, taxpayers also incurred significant legal fees in obtaining
advice on these classification issues. Further, the Service noted that small
businesses could be particularly hard hit by the considerable costs of obtaining
advice regarding how to structure business entities to obtain the most favorable
combination of state law and tax treatment. These additional cost, resource
allocation, and distributive considerations contributed to the Service’s decision to
move to a simplified elective entity classification regime [approximately a decade
later], where taxpayers could ‘elect to treat certain domestic unincorporated
business organizations as partnerships or as associations for federal tax
purposes,’ while still availing themselves of the local laws’ flexibility for
structuring unincorporated businesses.”(footnotes omitted) (quoting I.R.S. Notice
95-14, 1995-14 I.R.B. 7)).
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reason for such inaction cannot be attributed to a lack of
awareness. The vast majority of unauthorized tax elections
are not shrouded in deep secrecy; to the contrary, the mass
media routinely writes articles about them (albeit not
directly referring to them as “unauthorized elections”). 109
There are at least four reasons why unauthorized tax
elections have often proven so long-lasting and resilient.
First, the financial and administrative benefits
associated with unauthorized tax elections typically inure to
those politicians in power. 110 Consider the fact that most
congressional members come from the upper echelons of
wealth. 111 Maintaining unauthorized tax elections allows
them to preserve and, in some cases, augment their wealth.
Because it may be against their financial self-interest to
address unauthorized tax elections, turning a select blind
eye toward them, at least from their perspective, is a logical
response.

109. See, e.g., Leonard Sloane, Your Money: Clifford Trusts Facing Threats,
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1984, at 32 (describing how taxpayers could “elect” to use
trusts to mitigate their tax burdens); Arden Dale, Revising Grantor-Retained
Annuity Trusts, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2009, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/art
icles/SB124147213290384703 [https://perma.cc/7CYQ-3QD8] (explaining how
taxpayers can “elect” not to pay gift tax).
110. For example, many taxpayers utilize S corporations and “elect” to pay
themselves as little salary as possible to avoid employment taxes. See I.R.C.
§ 1402; see, e.g., David R. Sicular, Subchapter S at 55—Has Time Passed This
Passthrough By? Maybe Not, 68 TAX LAW. 185, 211–12 (2014) (“Such well-known
individuals as Newt Gingrich and John Edwards famously used S corporations
to take advantage of this fact.”); Paul Sullivan, The Advantages and Risks of
Gingrich’s Tax Strategy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb, 3, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com
/2012/02/04/your-money/advantages-and-risks-of-gingrichs-s-corporation.html
[https://perma.cc/K3HU-Q7HN] (explaining how Newt Gingrich and John
Edwards avoided paying a lot of taxes by categorizing their labor income as S
corporation earnings).
111. See generally Jonathan Klick, The Wealth of Congress, 40 HARV. J.L. &
POL’Y 603 (2017) (describing the vast amount of wealth that most congressional
members have accumulated); Karl Evers-Hillstrom, Majority of Lawmakers in
116th Congress Are Millionaires, OPEN SECRETS (April 23, 2020), https://www.
opensecrets.org/news/2020/04/majority-of-lawmakers-millionaires/ [https://perm
a.cc/XVS7-Q445].
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Second, the tax and estate planning legal bars also have
a financial self-interest in preserving unauthorized tax
elections. In most instances, the utilization of unauthorized
tax elections requires sophisticated planning. 112 That being
the case, tax professionals, commanding steep price tags, are
often called into duty to help clients orchestrate their
unauthorized tax elections. 113 Certainly, from the standpoint
of the tax and estate planning legal bar, maintaining the
status quo is an exercise in commercial self-preservation.
Third, there is no natural lobbying group focused on
opposing unauthorized tax elections. By their nature, having
been developed by sophisticated tax counsel, many
unauthorized tax elections are complex and hard to
understand. 114 As such, they do not attract the public’s ire
that other tax gimmicks generate, for example, the
utilization of offshore accounts to hide earnings, which are
immediately discernible and smack of fraudulent behavior.
Finally, due to political divisiveness, motivating
Congress to take action, even to defeat destructive tax ploys,
is not easy. 115 Indeed, there are those political action groups
that aver that closing these tax dodges is a cloaked attempt
to surreptitiously raise taxes. 116 Furthermore, the Treasury
112. Each unauthorized tax election described in this Article (e.g., Crummey
and bypass trusts) requires the advice of skilled professionals to navigate.
113. See, e.g., Field, Tax Elections, supra note 1, at 25 (noting that “where
taxpayers tend to be relatively sophisticated and well-advised, as in the context
of large corporate acquisitions where a regular section 338 election or a section
338(h)(10) election might be made, taxpayers are likely to be able to obtain the
necessary information about the tax law from their tax advisors, albeit at a high
hourly billing rate”).
114. See supra Part II.
115. See, e.g., Jake Johnson, Republicans Renege on Deal with Democrats,
Strip Funding for IRS in Gift to Rich Tax Cheats, SALON (July 19, 2021, 3:58 PM),
https://www.salon.com/2021/07/19/republicans-renege-on-deal-with-democratsstrip-funding-for-irs-in-gift-to-rich-tax-cheats_partner [https://perma.cc/AF9A8KTW] (describing how Senate Republicans refuse to bolster IRS funding,
equating it to a tax increase, notwithstanding that it would augment tax
compliance).
116. See, e.g., Grace Wyler, There Is a Second Part of Grover Norquist’s Tax
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Department is ordinarily reluctant to do anything
unilaterally—even addressing unauthorized tax elections—
at the risk of being criticized for overstepping its
administrative role, producing a torrent of political and
public opprobrium. 117
In light of these logistical obstacles, unauthorized tax
elections are likely to enjoy unwarranted and undeserved
longevity. The only times that Congress or the Treasury
Department usually opts to address them are when it
becomes apparent that a significant amount of revenue is at
risk of being lost or when the administrative burdens
associated with their use become intolerable.
As previously pointed out, consider two illustrative
examples that affirm this point.
i. Clifford Trusts
Years ago, taxpayers would routinely make
unauthorized tax elections to establish so-called Clifford
Pledge . . . And Many Conservatives Are Infuriated By It, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 29,
2012, 3:04 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/conservatives-cheer-on-nor
quists-waning-power-2012-11 [https://perma.cc/E3NJ-4DBC] (“[A]ccording to the
pledge, the elimination of any tax credit or deduction—including industry
subsidies and tax loopholes—qualifies as an increase in taxes.”).
117. See, e.g., Claire Hinshaw, Limitations on the Business Interest Deduction:
The New I.R.C. § 163(j) Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 38 REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 594, 607–08 (2019) (noting that “the AICPA criticizes the Treasury’s adoption
of a broad and detailed definition of interest and instead suggests interest include
‘any amount generally treated as interest under other provisions of the Code or
regulations’” (quoting Annette Nellen, Chair, Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accts.,
Re: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding the Limitation on Deduction for
Business Interest Expense [REG-106089-18] (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.aicpa
.org/content/dam/aicpa/advocacy/tax/downloadabledocuments/20190221%20aicp
a-comments-sec-163j-prop-regs.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZBG4-PNAF])); Christopher
R. Egan, Casenote, The Federal Circuit’s Shallow Analysis of Consolidated
Taxation Invalidates the Loss Disallowance Rule—Rite Aid Corp. v. United
States, 55 SMU L. REV. 1813, 1813 (2002) (“[T]he Federal Circuit invalidated the
long-criticized loss disallowance rule in Treasury Regulation Section 1.1502-20.
This rule limits the loss that consolidated corporate parents can recognize from
the sale of their subsidiary stock. Critics argue that the loss disallowance rule is
invalid because it creates a new tax without Congressional approval.” (footnote
omitted)).
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trusts. 118 The term of a typical Clifford trust would extend
ten years and one day, during which time the income
generated would be subject to the then lower trust tax rates;
and at the conclusion of the trust term, the accumulated
income and principal would revert to the trust settlor. 119 This
tax ruse, which jeopardized the integrity of the nation’s
income tax brackets, lasted several decades before Congress
decided that too much revenue was being siphoned off
annually. 120
ii. Bypass Trusts
As previously pointed out, 121 under the terms of their
wills, taxpayers would habitually establish testamentary
bypass trusts designed to utilize the estate tax exemption of
the first spouse to perish. Years later, when the
118. These trusts were eponymously named after the Helvering v. Clifford
decision. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
119. See Frank T. Adams, The Tax Reform Act of 1986—Moves to Eliminate
Income Tax Shifting and Deferral of Payments, 61 FLA. BAR J., Feb. 1987, at 59,
59 (“The Clifford trust was a widely accepted and utilized vehicle for providing
funds for the child’s education and to assist the child in early, relatively low,
earning years. In later years when the grantor’s income often began to wane, the
assets would come back to the grantor.”); John W. Bowman, Tax Savings Through
Income Splitting Still Available After Tax Reform Act, 15 TAX’N FOR LAWS. 324,
326–27 (1987) (“An income-shifting device that has been used for many years is
the Clifford trust, sometimes called a short-term or ten-year trust. These trusts
were used where a person wished to shift income to a lower tax bracket family
member but did not want to make an absolute transfer of the income-producing
property.”); see also Note, Conclusiveness of Trust Terms in Tax Litigation:
Circumvention of the Clifford Rule, 60 YALE L.J. 1426, 1426 (1951) (“Trusts are
frequently used to minimize income taxes. Since each autonomous trust is taxed
as a separate entity under the Internal Revenue Code, taxpayers can finesse the
upper tax brackets by distributing income-producing property among several
trusts.” (footnotes omitted)).
120. See, e.g., James W. Colliton, Standards, Rules and the Decline of the
Courts in the Law of Taxation, 99 DICK. L. REV. 265, 327 (1995) (“A sixth major
force in tax law development is the need to generate revenue. . . . The need for
revenue was apparent in the grantor trust tax changes made by the Tax Reform
Act of 1986. This Act had the objective of lowering tax rates by eliminating tax
preferences. Congress eliminated the benefits of the ten year trust to partially
make up for the revenue lost to lower rates.”).
121. See supra Section II.B.
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administrative onus associated with bypass trust use was
perceived to be a nightmare, Congress took action, making
the estate tax exemption amount portable between
spouses. 122
In the cases of both Clifford and bypass trusts, it took
several decades for Congress to take legislative action. And
the reality is that had Congress been more proactive, far less
tax revenue would have been lost, professional fees could
have been minimized, taxpayers would have had to endure
less administrative turmoil, and legislators might have
simultaneously elevated the Code’s public stature—all
virtuous goals, worth endeavoring to achieve.
2. Methodology to Address Unauthorized Tax Elections
Despite the fact that taxpayers have largely had free rein
to make unauthorized tax elections, this does not have to be
the case. Although unauthorized tax elections are often
unintended effects of congressional or Treasury actions, the
unauthorized tax elections themselves function as signals to
notify Congress and the Treasury of legislative or regulatory
weaknesses. If Congress and the Treasury pay attention,
they can eradicate or codify unauthorized tax elections—
whichever is preferable for taxpayers, the Code, and the fisc.
When Congress enacts legislation or the Treasury
Department promulgates regulations, neither is prescient.
As is sometimes reflected in the legislative history, Congress
commonly harbors expectations regarding the direction that
statutory construction will take, 123 but these determinations
are precatory in nature, untested by the creative minds of
tax professionals. The same can be said about Treasury
regulations and how the tax community will construe

122. See supra note 91.
123. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in
Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 848 (1992) (“Using legislative
history to help interpret unclear statutory language seems natural.”).
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them. 124 Once these laws and regulations are in the public
domain, tax professionals will do whatever is in their power
to hash over and configure the statutory and regulatory
verbiage in ways designed to alleviate the financial and
administrative burdens associated with tax compliance—
that is, develop unauthorized tax elections—and earn hefty
fees from their clients for doing so.
Furthermore, Congress is often loath to make wholesale
changes to the Code. Instead, piecemeal reform is routine:
Congress tackles one issue at a time and rarely examines the
Code as a whole. 125 As a result, structural incongruities
punctuate the Code, paving possible paths to unauthorized
tax election usage. 126 Grantor trust status use is emblematic
of this phenomenon. In the 1940s, by expanding the
definition of grantor trust status, Congress sought to address
the problem of taxpayers exploiting lower trust income tax
rates; fast-forward to 1986 when Congress compressed the
124. See generally Randolph E. Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in
Statutory Construction, 49 YALE L.J. 660 (1940) (describing how courts and
taxpayers construe Treasury regulations).
125. For example, a corporation that distributes current earnings and profits
is deemed to be making dividend payments, even though the corporation may
have experienced prior losses. I.R.C. § 316(a); STEPHEN SCHWARZ & DANIEL J.
LATHROPE, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION 154–55 (10th ed. 2019) (“This
seemingly harsh rule was enacted many years ago as a relief measure to permit
corporations with deficits to pay dividends and thus avoid an undistributed
profits tax then in effect. Although the tax was later repealed, the ‘nimble
dividend’ rule survived without any Congressional explanation of why it was still
necessary.”).
126. See, e.g., Matthew A. Melone, The Patenting of Tax Strategies: A Patently
Unnecessary Development, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 437, 472–73 (2007)
(“Patented tax strategies will not be designed for a single taxpayer but for a broad
enough market to justify their development costs. . . . Strategies that meet the
patentability standards of novelty and nonobviousness will likely have their
genesis in the structural infirmities of the Internal Revenue Code.”); Richard J.
Kovach, Technical and Policy Standards for Inflation Adjustments Under the
Internal Revenue Code, 33 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 603, 628 (2008) (noting that
“federal taxation policy has been glaringly inconsistent and haphazard in its
attempts to protect taxpayers against inflationary distortions”); Daze Swift Lee,
Tax Reform Proposals on a Gift Tax on the Transfer of Property by Nonresidents,
10 U. MASS. L. REV. 194, 208 (2014) (“First, the current Internal Revenue Code
creates inconsistency in the application of gift tax rules.”).
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trust tax bracket structure but failed to correspondingly
narrow the rules applicable to grantor trust status, opening
the door for taxpayer exploitation. 127
Unauthorized tax elections, though, do serve a beneficial
purpose: they spotlight vulnerabilities in statutory and
regulatory language and structural flaws in the Code’s
design. And once unauthorized tax elections fulfill their
signaling role, for the reasons already stated, their existence
can—and must—be addressed. Taking a page from
authorized tax elections, 128 Congress and the Treasury
Department should independently examine the merits and
flaws of each unauthorized tax election and either formally
institute or eradicate the particular election in question. The
one thing that Congress and the Treasury Department
should never do is ignore unauthorized tax elections—
whether their overall merits outweigh their shortcomings or
vice versa.
Eradicating those unauthorized tax elections that yield
more detriments than benefits speaks for itself. However,
given the reluctance of either Congress or the Treasury
Department to act, something must be done to incentivize
the legislative and administrative branches to undertake
purging initiatives. One recommendation immediately
comes to mind: years ago, Stanley Surrey developed the tax
expenditure budget, which pinpoints those Code provisions
that depart from the ideal and the costs associated with their
retention; 129 following this paradigm, the Joint Committee
127. See generally Burton W. Kanter & Michael J. Legamaro, The Grantor
Trust: Handmaiden to the IRS and Servant to the Taxpayer, 75 TAXES 706 (1997)
(explaining how taxpayers utilize grantor trust status to their advantage).
128. See supra Section III.A.
129. See Bernard Wolfman, Statesman, Scholar, Mentor, 98 HARV. L. REV. 343,
344 (1984) (“The ‘tax expenditure’ budget is Stanley Surrey’s signal achievement
in fiscal policy. Enacted over ten years ago, supported by his writing and that of
others, that budget and its underlying theory require every thoughtful person to
ask whether the tax law is the best vehicle—or even a sensible one—to effect
nontax social policy, to provide economic incentives, or to reward or punish.”);
Harry L. Gutman, Reflections on the Process of Enacting Tax Law, 26 OHIO N.U.
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on Taxation should develop a similar sort of cost expenditure
budget with respect to unauthorized tax elections. 130 Doing
so would bring heightened scrutiny to unauthorized tax
elections and hasten calls for their elimination.
The exact opposite is true with respect to those
unauthorized tax elections in which the associated benefits
outweigh the associated burdens: heightened scrutiny would
hasten calls for their codification, which would benefit not
only taxpayers but also the Treasury. Codification enables
Congress to mandate that certain conditions be met before
election privileges are extended. In some instances, such
conditions will be minor and entail simply checking a box; in
other situations, condition fulfillment will prove more
onerous. Importantly, part and parcel of making elections is
completing designated election forms. Such forms typically
elaborate when the election must be filed; where it must be
submitted; a checklist of those preconditions that must be
met before an election is permissible; and, in some instances,
the rationale behind the election’s availability. 131 As the
recipient of such forms, the IRS would be in a better position
to monitor taxpayer compliance, gauge the popularity of such
elections, and better calibrate where to direct the agency’s
limited resources. 132
Citizen lobbying and watchdog groups should call the
virtues of these beneficial unauthorized elections to the
L. REV. 183, 185 (2000) (“Stanley Surrey pioneered the effort to identify how and
the extent to which the tax system was being used to achieve non-tax objectives
through his introduction of the tax expenditure concept in 1967 and its
quantification in the tax expenditure budget.”).
130. See generally George K. Yin, How Codification of the Tax Statutes and the
Emergence of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation Helped Change the
Nature of the Legislative Process, 71 TAX L. REV. 723 (2018) (describing the role
of the Joint Committee on Taxation and its expertise in tax matters).
131. There is an elaborate treatise written exactly on the topic of federal tax
elections. MICHAEL B. LANG & COLLEEN A. KHOURY, FEDERAL TAX ELECTIONS
(1991).
132. See Field, Choosing Tax, supra note 1, at 29 (“The IRS must process
explicit elections to ensure taxpayer eligibility and compliance with the technical
requirements for the time and manner of making the election.”).
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public’s attention. 133 Indeed, politicians generally crave
having their names associated with an administrative costsavings mechanism or a device that saves taxpayers time,
money, and resources. 134 If these lobbying groups highlight
the advantages associated with certain unauthorized tax
elections, they are sure to generate political interest and
cultivate an amenable environment for codification.
In a nutshell, transforming something that was once
unauthorized into something that is authorized elevates its
status, making the entire process far more transparent to
both the IRS and the general public.
CONCLUSION
This analysis illustrates that the existence of
unauthorized tax elections is neither an inherent evil nor an
unalloyed blessing. Instead, unauthorized tax elections
function as important signaling mechanisms that something
in the governing or administrative law is askew, requiring a
complete overhaul or a minor tweaking. Congress and the
Treasury Department thus have a responsibility to monitor
the existence of such elections and, on a case-by-case basis,
respond by either eradicating or formally institutionalizing
them.
Due to the manipulative nature of unauthorized tax
elections, they admittedly do not instill taxpayer faith and
confidence in the integrity of the Code. From a public policy
perspective, once they serve their signaling purpose of
133. See, e.g., Karl Evers-Hillstrom, Left-Leaning Watchdog: Companies
Avoiding Taxes Spent Millions on Lobbying, THE HILL (June 9, 2021, 3:30 PM),
https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/557588-left-leaning-watchdog-companies
-avoiding-taxes-have-spent-millions-on [https://perma.cc/M927-CSWQ] (“Fiftyfive companies that didn’t pay any corporate income tax in 2020 shelled out $408
million on lobbying over the past six years, according to a new report from leftleaning watchdog group Public Citizen.”).
134. See Gregory Koger, Position Taking and Cosponsorship in the U.S. House,
28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 225, 225–26 (2003) (explaining why congressional members
would want their names associated with particular legislative bills).
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alerting the powers that be that reforms should be
undertaken, their existence should ideally be short-term.
Accordingly, Congress and the Treasury Department must
identify unauthorized tax elections and swiftly respond to
address them.
If Congress and the Treasury Department heed this
advice and limit the longevity of unauthorized tax elections,
the salutary effects would be enormous. Legislative and
administrative goals would be more readily fulfilled, fiscal
needs met, and public confidence in the nation’s tax system
strengthened. Just as authorized elections often serve
critical roles in productively shaping the contours of the Code
and facilitating tax administration, unauthorized elections,
if appropriately and timely handled, can do so as well.

